T-Test for Terrorism: Did the Introduction of Proportional Representation Reduce the Terrorist Threat? A Time-Series Case Study of Algeria and Northern Ireland by Qvortrup, Matt
  
T-Test for Terrorism: Did the 
Introduction of Proportional 
Representation Reduce the Terrorist 
Threat? A Time-Series Case Study of 
Algeria and Northern Ireland 
 
Qvortrup, M. 
 
Author post-print (accepted) deposited by Coventry University’s Repository 
 
Original citation & hyperlink:  
Qvortrup, M. (2015) T-Test for Terrorism: Did the Introduction of Proportional 
Representation Reduce the Terrorist Threat? A Time-Series Case Study of Algeria and 
Northern Ireland. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, volume 38 (4): 293-304  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2014.991165 
 
DOI 10.1080/1057610X.2014.991165 
ISSN 1057-610X 
ESSN 1521-0731 
 
Publisher: Taylor and Francis 
 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism on 3rd February 2015, available online: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/1057610X.2014.991165. 
 
Copyright © and Moral Rights are retained by the author(s) and/ or other copyright 
owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge. This item cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively 
from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). The 
content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium 
without the formal permission of the copyright holders.  
 
This document is the author’s post-print version, incorporating any revisions agreed during 
the peer-review process. Some differences between the published version and this version 
may remain and you are advised to consult the published version if you wish to cite from 
it.  
Accepted for publication in ‘Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 38- 4 (April 2015) 
 
Research Note: 
T-Test for Terrorism 
Did the introduction of proportional representation reduce the terrorist threat?  
A time-series case study  
 
MATT QVORTRUP 
Political Science 
Coventry University 
 
Abstract: Can electoral reform lead to a reduction in the number of terrorist incidents? 
Economists have shown that the introduction of constitutional institutions such as courts in 
the early 18th century had a direct effect on investment. Could there be a similar link between 
the introduction of proportional representation (PR) electoral systems and a reduction in the 
number of terrorist attacks? Previous studies using cross sectional data have found a negative 
correlation between the presence of PR-electoral systems and the number of terrorist 
incidents. However, earlier studies were based on aggregate figures, not on time-series data. 
They did not provide a direction that could be used to measure the possible effect of the 
introduction of PR. This research note addresses this problem. Using a Pair Sampled t-test it 
is possible to show that the introduction of proportional representation in Northern Ireland 
and Algeria led to a marked reduction in the number of terrorist attacks. The note thus adds 
strength to earlier studies 
 
‘At one time that was all we could do, that was the only avenue open to us, was to 
engage in armed struggle...I think it was inevitable that the nationalist people took up 
arms. There was no viable democratic alternative” 1 
Irish Republican prisoner interviewed by Richard 
English.  
 
Can political participation contribute to a reduction of terrorism? In particular can a change of 
the electoral system from a majoritarian system to a proportional system reduce the number 
of terrorist attacks? And, if so, why?  
 
Case studies published in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, have suggested that “a 
considerable democratic deficit enabled a radicalization process” in the Basque Country2. 
Consistent with this finding, increased democratic engagement can limit the prevalence of 
terrorist attacks. This was shown in research about Quebec also published in this journal. 
Here it was suggested that the risk of violent action subsided when a political party became 
regarded as “the legitimate...political voice and representative of Quebeckers”3. And more 
recent cross-sectional analyses of terrorist attacks in has found a strong negative correlation 
between having a large number of terrorist attacks and having many political parties (which 
ceteris paribus increases the opportunity for providing input into the political process)4.  
This research note adds a times-series dimension to this research. After a brief overview of 
the literature to date, a theoretical model is presented. This argues that proportional 
representation increases the opportunities for voicing grievances, which in turn, provides a 
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safety valve for democracies. To render this conclusion plausible, however, requires more 
than cross-sectional correlations (as in the previous literature). To show that the  introduction 
of proportional representation has a positive effect on the reduction of terrorism a pair 
sampled t-test is carried out for two countries that recently have suffered a large number of 
terrorist attacks. 
 
Previous Research on the Democracy –Terrorism Nexus 
Research on the relationship between terrorism and democracy has yielded different results. 
But most have shown a negative correlation between democracy and terrorism5. Thus, 
research by, respectively, Schmid6 and Sandler7 - to name but two - have suggested that non-
democratic states have lower levels of terrorism as they are able to ride roughshod over civil 
liberties and citizens’ concerns, as Martha Crenshaw noted in an earlier article making the 
same point but using a different methodology8.  
However, assuming that most democratic countries do not want to forego democratic 
practices in an attempt to defeat terrorism, the question arises as to whether there are systemic 
differences between different kinds of democracies. “Democracies”, as Li has noted, “are not 
homogeneous but have different electoral systems”9. This – he hypotheses – has implications 
for the occurrence of terrorist attacks. As he explains, “As these systems aggregate political 
preferences differently, they influence citizen satisfaction and political grievances differently, 
producing disparate effects on the incentives to engage in terrorism”10. Following on from Li, 
there has been considerable evidence to suggest that there is a correlation between having a 
proportional representation electoral system and suffering low levels of terrorist activity.  
Analysing the effects of different democratic systems on civil wars, Marta Reynal-Querol11 
argues that the proportional system has a lower probability of group rebellion than the 
majoritarian system. This is so because the opportunity cost of rebellion is higher under the 
more participatory proportional system than under the majoritarian system. Hence, she finds 
that countries using proportional systems have a lower probability of experiencing civil wars 
than those which have majoritarian systems.  
Based on the analyses by Huber and Powell12 (1994) and Reynal-Querol aforementioned 
study (2002), Quan Li (2005) has argued that variations in democratic electoral systems also 
systematically influence transnational terrorism.  Li’s argument is that “because the 
proportional system is most inclusive and has the closest congruence between citizen 
preferences and public policies, the proportional system is more likely to resolve political 
grievances than either the majoritarian or the mixed system, reducing incentives to resort to 
terrorism. Alternative nonviolent solutions to grievances also are more accessible under the 
proportional system than under the majoritarian system” 13. This correlation has been 
supported by comparative studies in Western Europe14 and in established democracies across 
the world15, though some have criticised the methodology16. 
More recent studies  have confirmed that there is a link between political institutions and the 
levels of terrorist attacks perpetrated by what Hoffman has termed domestic terrorist 
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groups17. In a quantitative cross-sectional study it was reported that there is a correlation 
between a high score on the so-called Index of Majoritarian Government and the presence of 
fatal terrorist attacks perpetrated by home grown terrorist groups18.  
But a correlation is one thing, it is quite another to show there has been a direct directional 
effect of a change of electoral system; to show that electoral reform has lead to more 
representation by marginalised groups. What has not been undertaken is a Time-Series study 
which considers the temporal effect of the introduction of mechanisms of proportional 
representation. 
Before undertaking an empirical analysis it is necessary to consider briefly the possible 
reasons why the introduction of PR could lower the level of terrorist incidents. 
Terrorism and Political Participation: Outline of a Theory 
Political scientists often view the political system as an input-output model, in which groups 
in society articulate demands, which are channelled into the Political System by aggregators 
(typically political parties) and transformed into policies, decisions and actions, in other 
words Outputs19. Conceptually speaking, terrorism can be seen as a result of a break-down on 
the input side of the political system. When views by a minority groups, fail to be 
‘aggregated’ by political parties or other representatives, the result may be that groups resort 
to violence. Terrorism becomes an alternative – and faulty - ‘aggregator’. This can be 
illustrated by David Easton’s well-known model (See Figure 1). 
Figure 1 in here 
Following this model, one would expect that greater influence over policy making –say, by 
participating in coalitions or concessions on important legislation (which are often the result 
of multi-party systems found in countries with PR20)- would discourage minority groups from 
resorting to political violence. Indeed, such an argument has previously been suggested in 
Studies of Conflict and Terrorism21. But how can this hypothesis be corroborated? How can 
be ‘prove’ that lack of democratic influence leads to more terrorist attacks? And how can we 
show that the introduction of PR has  had the effect of lowering the number of terrorist 
incidents?  
While this author certainly does not share Lord Kelvin’s infamous remark, “If you can’t 
measure it you can’t prove it”22, there is a place for statistical analysis in terrorism research. 
Quantitative analyses do not reveal the whole truth, but such techniques can help identify 
patterns which complement more qualitative or ideographic approaches23. The question –
assuming this model is correct – is how this lack of influence can be measured?  
There is no perfect way of doing so, but all other things being equal, one would expect that a 
more proportional – or more representative – political system would offer citizens greater 
chances of voicing their concerns (As indeed it did in Northern Ireland, and arguably in 
Algeria24 (See below). Before turning to the statistical testing, it is useful to consider the logic 
of institutional change. This can be done through an illustrative short excursus into economic 
history. 
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Excursus: Institutions and Policy Outcomes 
Some years ago the economist Douglas North (who later won the Nobel prize for this work) 
and a prominent political scientist Berry Weingast wrote an article about the effect of 
institutions on economic growth and investment.25 In the article the two scholars found that 
after Britain had established institutions that could enforce contracts, economic growth grew 
exponentially. There was, they wrote, a clear link between the new institutions and the 
increased economic growth. The argument was accompanied by a graph of the growth of the 
value stock-market, as measured by the number of ‘securities’ (see Figure One); 
Figure Two in Here 
The accompanying text read, “In the early 1670s, the volume of these securities averaged 
£300.000 per year. Ten years later, volume averaged £ 3.400.000 per year, and by the early 
1710s, £11.000.000 per year”26. The two scholars did not carry out advanced statistical 
analyses, but nevertheless concluded – perhaps slightly unwarranted – that “we have...shown 
how institutions played a necessary role in making possible economic growth and political 
freedom”27. Now philosophers and avid viewers of the West Wing may – rightly warn – that 
we should not commit the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc – which in English translates 
as something like: "after this, therefore because of this".  Nevertheless, if there is a link, it 
needs to be investigated. What if we were presented with a similar graph as regards terrorism 
and political institutions? 
 
Figure Two shows the development of terrorism in Northern Ireland from the early 1970s 
when the ‘troubles’ began. Based on a superficial reading of the graph there is clearly a 
pattern.  In addition to a number smaller fluctuations in the mid-1970s (roughly coinciding 
with the Sunningdale Agreement) and the mid-1980s (Coinciding with the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement), there is a marked decline in the number of incidents from the mid-1990s. The 
first drop in the latter decade coincides – not surprisingly – with the ceasefire declared by the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) in 1995), which was broken in 1996 after – what was perceived 
to be  - unwillingness by the British Conservative government to negotiate at a time when 
Prime Minister John Major relied on Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist parties from Northern 
Ireland to secure his wafer-thin  majority in the House of Commons28.  
 
Figure Three in Here 
But what is above all interesting is that after the introduction of the Good Friday Agreement 
1998, there is a marked drop in the number of terrorist incidents. Could it be that the 
introduction of institutions of power-sharing had an effect that was analogous to North and 
Weingast’s courts?  
 
Hypothesis 
Combining the input-out model of the political system with the North-Weingast model, we 
are able to develop a hypothesis regarding the effect of the introduction of proportional 
representation. We assume that the chances for influence – or even just voicing a concern – 
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will be increased with the introduction of proportional representation as this electoral system, 
all other things being equal, will lead to a larger number of parties in the  legislature and 
hence a greater probability that an aggrieved minority will be represented.  
 
In line with North-Weingast, we conjecture that the introduction of a new institution, in this 
case proportional representation, will have a measurable effect. 
 
The hypothesis investigated in this research note is: 
 
 H1: The Introduction of Proportional Representation resulted in a reduction in the number 
of terrorist attacks 
 
How can this hypothesis be tested? 
 
Research Design: Pair Sampled T-Test for Terrorism 
Just eye-balling the curve and looking for a pattern is not sufficient if we are to draw solid 
conclusions. We need to answer three questions:  
 
1) What statistical method is appropriate for testing the hypothesis?  
2) Which cases can we use? and;  
3)  Are the statistical findings sociologically credible? 
 
Statistical Method 
What we want to measure is if a change in the electoral system (from a majoritarian system to 
a PR system) had an impact on the levels of terrorist attacks29. Using two countries that 
changed their electoral systems we can compare the number of incidents in the ten years 
before the change and the eight years after the change. 
 
Whereas regression models and other techniques such as Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient 
measure a numerical relationship across time and without a time-dimension, a Pair Sampled 
T-Test is a technique for determining if there has been a change in the findings before and 
after an event.  
 
Thus a pair-samples t-test is used when you have only one group of cases and collect data 
from them under two different conditions. Pre-change and post-change are examples of the 
type of situation where this technique is appropriate30. In other words, this statistical 
technique is well suited for measuring the statistical difference between before and after the 
electoral system was changed31. 
 
Case selection 
Two jurisdictions with high levels of terrorism (more than 25 instances per year32) changed 
their electoral systems in the past twenty- five years33. The two jurisdictions were Northern 
Ireland and Algeria. In Northern Ireland the system of the Single Transferable Vote (STV) 
was introduced. Algeria introduced the system of List Proportional Representation (Largest 
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remainder method using the Hare quota for seat allocation)34. Before looking at the statistical 
findings a bit of historical contextual knowledge is necessary if we are to understand the two 
cases. 
 
Northern Ireland 
In the late 1960 the -largely Catholic- Republican/Irish nationalist minority in Northern 
Ireland reacted to increased attacks by para-military groups purporting to represent the 
largely Protestant Loyalist majority in the province35. The Irish Republican Army (IRA), 
which had been dormant in the province since partition in 192236, re-emerged and began a 
terrorist campaign. In the words of Anthony King, “the uneasy truce between Protestants and 
Catholics, that had prevailed in Northern Ireland ever since the creation of the Irish Free State 
in 1922 broke down totally in the late 1960s”37. The IRA’s terror campaign was first directed 
against loyalist targets in the province itself. After increased tensions, the British Westminster 
government imposed direct rule and abolished the hitherto existing Stormond Parliament, and 
– in an apt phrase coined by the Conservative Cabinet minister Lord Hailsham – now 
“governed like a Persian satrapy”38. After a failed attempt to implement a power-sharing 
agreement in 1974 (the so-called Sunningdale Agreement), the IRA began a campaign on the 
British mainland39. During this time the British government introduced a number of anti-
terrorist measures, such as The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provision) Act 1978, which 
were criticised in a UN General Assembly Resolution, for its allegedly  “flagrant violations of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms”40. These measures did little to reduce the levels of 
terrorism and the IRA campaign continued. It culminated in the bombing – in 1984 – of the 
Grand Hotel in Brighton, which nearly killed Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. After the 
Brighton bombing, the British and Irish governments reached the Anglo-Irish Agreement, 
which stipulated that the ultimate fate of the province should be decided by referendum41. In 
1995, almost a decade later, the IRA declared a ceasefire, and the loyalist paramilitaries 
followed suit. The truce was broken a year later following – what the IRA – perceived to be 
the unwillingness of the then Conservative government to give concessions. After the 
election of Tony Blair’s New Labour in May 1997, the IRA and the Loyalist paramilitaries 
declared another ceasefire. This paved the way for the Good Friday Agreement  or Belfast 
Agreement in 1998, which re-established a parliament for Northern Ireland, a consociational 
system of power-sharing and a system of proportional representation for the Stormont 
Assembly. After a few set-backs, - including temporary direct rule in 2000 – the Northern 
Ireland Executive assumed control in 2006 after the British and Irish government signed the 
St Andrews Agreement42. Even during the period of direct rule, the Northern Ireland 
Assembly’s had been elected and the elected parties – including parties that had previously 
been regarded as ‘extreme’, such as the Catholic/Republican Sinn Fein and the 
Loyalist/Protestant Democratic Unionist Party – took part in the negotiations and gave 
legitimacy to the agreement43.  
 
Algeria  
Shortly after independence from France Algeria was ruled as a one-party state44.  After 
twenty years of authoritarian rule, Algeria reintroduced democracy in the late 1980s. 
However, it soon became clear that the radical Islamists were an electoral force, though they 
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did not command a majority of the population45. In the first round of the election in 1991 
(held under a majoritarian system), Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) won 188 out of 231 seats 
with 47 percent of the vote.  In response to the looming defeat, the army – les décideurs (or 
as the army is also known)-– pressurised President Chadli Benjedid to cancel the second 
round46.   
 
Shortly after, in 1992, Benjedid was ousted in a coup d’état by General Khaled Nezzar and a 
group of officers who wanted closer ties with France.  (This group is known as hizb França – 
literally the party of France47). Nezzar’s action was not entirely undemocratic.  The FIS did 
not have a majority, and, as Nezzar said, ‘it would be intolerable if men [sic!] coming to 
power through democracy led us to dictatorship’48.   
 
The junta – a committee of five senior officers known as the Haute Comité d’ Ētat - began by 
banning all political activity in mosques, prohibited FIS altogether – and interned thousands 
in prison camps in Sahara.  To give an air of respectability to the Haute Comité, Mohamed 
Boudiaf – one of the original founders of the FLN – was selected as its figurehead.  Boudiaf 
tried to return the country to a form of democracy but made little headway.  On 29 June 1992, 
Boudiaf's term as chairman was cut short when he was assassinated by a bodyguard during a 
televised public speech at the opening of a cultural centre in Annaba.  He was succeeded by 
Liamine Zeroual, a retired general who tried to balance between those in the military who 
favoured repression (les éradicateurs) and those who favoured a more consensus-oriented 
approach (les conciliateurs)49. 
 
At first the éradicateurs prevailed.  Internments, extra-judicial killings on a scale not seen 
since the French repression in the 1950s became the order of the day50.  The Islamists, now 
organised in the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) responded in kind.  The GIA leader 
Abdelkader Hattab issued a leaflet entitled ‘Throat-Slitting and Murder until the Power is 
God’s’51.  By the end of 1994 the conflict had cost 30,000 lives52.  It was in this climate of 
indiscriminate violence that Liamine Zeroaul entered discussions with the FIS leaders Abassi 
Madani and Ali Belhadj.  As a consequence of the negotiations hard-line GIA factions began 
attacking what they regarded as conciliatory FIS groups.  Trying to find a way through the 
impasse representatives of the FLN and the FIS met in Rome, where they signed up to the 
‘Rome Platform’, which included a commitment to political pluralism, recognition of Berber 
rights, multi-party democracy and an electoral system of proportional representation53.  
Having reached a modus vivendi with his erstwhile enemies, Zeroaul pushed through a series 
of constitutional reforms, including a system of proportional representation, which ensured 
that no party would have an absolute majority, and that governments in the future would have 
to seek a consensus with political parties of a different persuasion or political colour54. The 
platform -and the constitutional reforms it contained - were endorsed by the voters in a 
referendum in 1996, which was relatively fair given the circumstances.55   
 
Did these reforms have a statistical effect on the level of terrorist activity in the two 
jurisdictions? 
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Results: Pair Sampled T-Test for Terrorism 
When a paired-samples t-test was conducted to evaluate the impact of the introduction of the 
proportional representation in Northern Ireland, there was a statistically significant decrease 
in the number of incidents from the period before the Good Friday Agreement56.  
 
The pair-samples t-test for Northern Ireland yielded the expected results. There was a 
statistically significant decrease in the number of terrorist incidents from time one, pre 1998 
(M= 122, SD= 81) to time two (post 1998) (M=30, SD 28),, t(8)=3.979, p<.004 (two-tailed). 
The mean decrease in incidents was 91.4, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 38.4 
to 144.4. The Eta-Squared statistic (.78) indicates a very considerable statistical effect which 
is consistent with the cross-sectional results reported by Li57.  
 
Needless to say, Northern Ireland can be seen as an isolated case. This pattern seems to 
corroborate the finding that consensus institutions are correlated with lower levels of terrorist 
incidents. 
 
Of course, one single example does not prove a theory. What is needed is data from 
elsewhere from a different setting. So consider the case of Algeria. Like in Northern Ireland, 
Algeria suffered catastrophic levels of terrorism in the 1990s. In 1997, following the return of 
democracy in 1995, a system of List Proportional Representation was introduced in 1997 
with accompanying power institutions of power-sharing as outlined in the previous section58.  
If the experience from Northern Ireland is anything to go by we would expect that the levels 
of terrorism would go down.   
 
Interestingly – and notwithstanding the enormous differences between the two jurisdictions -, 
we find the same pattern in Algeria. When a Paired-Samples t-test was conducted to evaluate 
the impact of the introduction of consensus institutions on the level of terrorist incidents in 
the latter country, there was a statistically significant decrease in the number of incidents in 
terrorist incidents from time 1  to Time 2.. The Paired-Samples t-test seems – statistically - to 
confirm the positive impact of the introduction of Proportional Representation on the level of 
terrorist incidents in the North African country. With a statistically significant decrease in the 
number of incidents in Terrorist Incidents from time 1  (Mean= 202,7 , SD=113.3 ) to Time 2 
(Mean=58.5 SD=36.5), t (7) p<.0.05= (two- tailed), the mean decrease in the number of 
terrorist incidents was  144.3 with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 33  to 255.4 and 
an eta-squared statistic (.42). This indicates a considerable effect size. Indeed, anything above 
.30 is normally regarded as conclusive evidence59  
 
Discussion  
The statistical connection between having a lower level of terrorist attacks in Northern 
Ireland after the introduction of Proportional Representation after the 1998 Good Friday 
Agreement, is consistent with the hypotheses proposed by earlier writers such as above all Li 
(See above). The presence of parties (believed to be) representing terror organisations60 gave 
a voice to hitherto unrepresented parts of both Catholic and Protestant communities in 
Northern Ireland. The presence of elected representatives in the Northern Ireland Assembly 
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to voice and articulate the demands of the Republican and Loyalist fringes arguably provided 
an input into the political system which reduced – though not entirely eliminated – the need 
to resort to terrorist actions. Of course, historical and quantitative evidence is needed to 
corroborate this, but there is a clear indication that the introduction of proportional 
representation – and the accompanying increase in representation of hitherto disenfranchised 
groups – worked to reduce tensions. 
 
Is the same true for Algeria? Needless to say, Northern Ireland and Algeria cannot be 
compared and the latter country is certainly far from being a well-functioning democracy. To 
wit, In 2013 Reporters Without Borders ranked Algeria at 125th out of 179 countries in their 
Press Freedom Index61. But the pattern we found in Northern Ireland is strikingly similar to 
the statistical findings of earlier writers who have hypothesised that PR leads to reduced 
levels of terrorism62. To be sure, Algeria is not a democracy (the country was categorized as 
‘Non-Free’ by Freedom House throughout the period under analysis63), but the presence of 
political parties that were previously considered to be affiliated to radical Islamic  
organisations (such as Mouvement de la société pour la paix, which is affiliated to the Muslim 
Brotherhood) seems to have added legitimacy to decisions and have arguable given hitherto 
disenfranchised groups a voice, if not a share of executive power. However, the fact that 
some of the Islamist political parties urged a boycott after 200764 (and that terrorist attacks 
increased after this date) may suggest there limits to the explanatory value of the hypothesis. 
 
Conclusion  
In an article about ISIS entitled, 'Iraq Illusions' in the August 2014 issue of the New York 
Review of Books, Jessica Mathews, the president of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, expressed the view that “the story, which seemed to be all about religion 
and military development, is actually mostly about politics;...a say in decision-making, and a 
modicum of social justice"65.  There is nothing revolutionary or new in these remarks per se. 
Indeed, research in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism has previously suggested that lack of 
genuine democratic input into the political system can engender a process of radicalization66. 
But somehow this connection has been lost on policy-makers who seem more attracted to 
deterrence as a mechanism for combating terrorism67.   
 
This research note has corroborated the connection suggested by more qualitative studies 
through a paired t-test, which found evidence to suggest that – statistically speaking – there 
was a strong connection between the introduction of PR and a lowering of the total number of 
terrorist incidents in Northern Ireland and in Algeria.  To paraphrase North and Weingast’s 
research on institutions, the research note has shown how institutions, in this case 
proportional representation, played a necessary role in reducing the number of terrorist 
incidents68. 
 
Why does it seem that there are fewer terrorist attacks in countries with proportional 
representation?  At a fundamental level, this research note argued, terrorism in democracies 
occurs when the citizens have inadequate opportunities to make them heard and when they 
fail to be represented in any meaningful way.   
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Of course, there are many different forms of terrorist attacks. And there are some question-
marks over the effect of PR in Algeria. To say that all terror attacks have the same aetiology 
would be sheer folly, and more importantly incorrect. But there is nevertheless be a pattern; a 
tendency that domestic terror attacks and the electoral system. It is hard to argue with the 
finding that proportional representation – previously seen as the fancy of anorak 
constitutional reformers 69– nevertheless is strongly associated with fewer terrorist incidents. 
 
Maybe policy-makers should consider electoral reform rather than hard-hitting measures that 
often end up limiting civil liberties? 
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Figures  
Figure 1.  David Easton’s Model of the Political System 
 
Source: David Easton (1965) A System Analysis of Political Life, Wiley, New York, p.32 
 
Figure Two: Growth of the London Stock Market 1690-1715 
 
Source: North & Weingast (1989).  
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Fig Three: Terrorist Incidents in Northern Ireland 1970-2008 
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